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IN TilE SUPRI\A1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 16321 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment against 
Defendants estopping them from withholding approval of 
Plaintiffs' proposed residential subdivision plan. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\',-ER COURT 
The lower court ordered that the subdivision be approved 
and that subsequent development within it be allowed free 
from any c;ub,~rcqtll'lll zonjng changes limiting or restricting 
resi dPnt i a l w-;<'s. 
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NATURE OF RELILF SOUGHT 0:.1 APPEAL 
Defendants seek to reverse the lower court's order 
estopping Defendants from disapproving Plaintiffs' 
proposed residential subdivision. 
STATEME~T OF FACTS 
In or about June 1977, Plaintiffs approached the 
City of Logan in the course of preyaring a preliminary 
plan for a residential subdivision to be located in an 
M-l(hlanufacturing) zone. R.l53. Single family dwellings 
were permitted uses in that zone at the time of the 
application, but the zoning ordinance was amended on 
January 31, 1978 to allow such uses only occasionally and 
incidental to manufacturing uses by special use permit. 
Whole residential subdivisions were prohibi~d. R.lOl. 
(Sec. 17-4-2(e), Logan City Ordina~ces.) 
Shortly after initial contact with the City, in 
conversations with the Plaintiffs' engineer, the City 
Planner questioned the advisability of developing a 
residential subdivision plat in the area proposed. R.l53. 
Plaintiffs, nevertheless, continued with tl1eir plans, 
prepared a preliminary subdivision plat, (R.l55) expending 
$890 for it and another $1,335 for a boundary survey. R.l23. 
The Planning Commission's practice is to merely 
introduce the preliminary plat in one m~eting (first reading) 
-2-
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and in the S<·cotHl meeting discuss its merits and take 
action. R.JSG" Plaintiffs' project li·as introduced on 
July 13, 1977. R.85-86. The s~cond reading was held on 
August 10, 1077. Some concerns were expressed by the 
Planning Commission (R.90) and the ruatter was tabled and 
referred to the Municipal Council for their input. R.86. On 
August 18, 1977, the Municipal Council reviewed the matter 
and expressed some concerns about protecting the potential 
residential area from manufacturing uses within the 
development and that more roadways in and out of the 
subdivision be provided. R.92, 157. 
The preliminary plan second reading continued tefore 
the Planning Commission on September 14, 1977 at which time 
concern about the danger of the adjacent railroad activity 
was cxpressed,and the matter was tabled for sixty days. 
R.94. Although the matter was not before them for approval, 
on October 12, 1977, the Planning Coi.~ission and Planner 
discussed the intent of the City's zoning ordinance as it 
relates to residential uses in H-1 zones. R.95. The intent 
of the ordinance was to allow citizens operating manufactur-
ing concerns in the zone to construct homes incidental to 
the manufacturing use. R.95, 158. On Nove~ber 9, 1977, the 
Planning Commission took action to disapprove Plaintiffs' 
preliminary plan based on the fact that: (l) Development 
-3-
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of residential subdivisions in M-1 ;cones was contrary to 
the land use ordinance. (2) Development of a rtc·sid,'ntial 
subdivision in an M-1 zone is contrary t'l the City's master 
plan. (3) Accesses to the subdivision wPre inadequate. 
(4) The location of the railroad on three sides of the 
subdivision made it an inappropriate site for housing. R.96. 
Some of their reasons were further articulated in a letter 
to the Municipal Council dated November 17, 1977. R.97. 
On November 17, the Plaintiffs appeared before the 
Municipal Council requesting that their preliminary plan 
be approved. The ~!unicipal Council reviewed the Plannin~ 
Commission's letter then refused to approve the proposed 
subdivision. R.99-100. ~o protective covenants were ever 
drawn up to elimir -n uufacturing uses within the 
subdivision and no second exit from the subdivision was 
ever planned. R.l55. It was never modified in any way 
but remained as originally presented. 
Because the Municipal Council began preparations to 
amend or clarify the zoning ordinance on the matter of 
housing in M-1 zones, Plaintiffs coi'C11enced this action on 
December 23, 1977, on which date application for a 
restraining order was made which order was made on January 3, 
1978 restraining the City from amending its zoning ordinance. 
R.l4. On April 18, 1978, after motion by Defendants, the 
injunction was terminated. R.B0-81. The City's change 
-4-
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11r clarlflcatiun of the ~onlng ordinance took place on 
January 19, 1978 (R.l02) and became effective as it 
pertained to Plaintiffs' property on the date the injunction 
was terminated. 
ARGUI.lENT 
I 
TilE APPROVAL OF SUBDIVISIO~ ACCESSES AND ROADWAYS 
INVOLVES A DEGREE OF DISCRETION THE EXERCISE OF 
WHICH WAS JUSTIFICATIOX FOR DISAPPROVAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SlBDIVISION. 
In dealing with questions of whether a proposed 
rP.sidential subdivision plan should be approved, Defendants 
recognize and have no argwnent with the fact that the act 
of approval is administrative in nature, Martindale v. 
Anderson, et al., (Ut. 1978) 581 P.2d 1022, and largely 
ministerial, Eldorado at Santa Fe, Inc., v. Board of 
County Commissions of Santa Fe County, 39 N.JI. 313, 551 
P.2d 1360 (1976). However, many administrative actions 
involve some discretionary action. So it is with approval 
of subdivisions. Roussey v. City of Burlingame, et al. 
(Cal. 1950) 223 P.2d 517, Ayers v. City Council of City 
of Los An~elcs (Cal. 1949) 207 P.2d 1. Take for example 
Lhe act of openlng a road to public use which is part of 
the action taken when a subdivision is approved. 
In Town of Perry v. Thomas, et al., 82 Ut. 159, 22 P.2d 
~13 (1933), where a town decided to convert a private road 
-5-
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into a public street and to widen it al the sa~c time, 
property owners and citi~ens in the area questioned the 
town's right to do so. There this court stated: 
"Under powers thus delegated to municipfl.J boards 
the necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening 
a public street or way is a political question, 
and in the absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse 
of discretion the action of such board ~ill not 
be disturbed by the courts." (citing cases). 
22 P.2d 343, 345. 
The traffic flow, access, location and configuration 
of a new roadway has always been a legitimate concern 
for cities including proposed accesses resulting from a 
subdivision of land. Nicoli v. Planning and Zoning 
Commission of Town of Easton, 179 Conn. 89, 368 A.2d 24 
( 1976). 
In Pearson Kc~~ C~rporation v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 
271 H.E.2d 218 (1971), the county planning corrEission 
denied approval of plaintiff's proposed residenTial subdivision 
even though the plan itself was not intrinsically unaccept-
able beca~se the project was so located as to create danger 
to nearly residents in that roads through which the plaintiff 
would channel traffic were too narrow and unable to 
accommodate additional traffic, and the absence of sidewalks 
would increase hazards to young children going to school. 
In that circumstance the highest court for the St;' te of 'iev. 
York said: 
"But the co=ission is not lir:1ited in disapprovinc; 
a subdivision, to an intrinsic evaluation of th<c 
-6-
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c;ubdivision itscdf. It may consider, among other 
things, t!Ho "safety" and "general welfare" of the 
county, including adjaCfcnt areas, Thus, as a 
matter of legal power, the commission acted within 
its jurisdiction. And if it was within its 
jurisdiction it is not easy to say that its action 
was arbitrary and without reasonable basis." 
271 N.E.2d 218, 219. 
The following cases are further examples of the proper 
exercise of discretion in the approval or disapproval of 
subdivisions: Stoptaugh v. Bd. of County Commissioners 
of El Paso County, (Colo.) 543 P.2d 524; Barke & McCaffrey 
Inc., v. City of Merriam, (Kan. 1967) 424 P.2d 483; and 
Jones v. Town of Woodway, (Wash. 1967) 424 P.2d 904. 
In this case presently before the Court, the planner, 
the planning co1~ission, and the municipal council expressed 
concern about the single access proposed by Plaintiffs 
(R.92, 96, 97, 153, 157), and the suggestion was made that 
Plaintiffs provide another means of ingress and egress for 
the proposed subdivision. R.92, 157. That second means 
of ingress and egress was never provided and the subdivision 
plan remained as it was originally presented. R.l55. Consider, 
as the Defendants did, what would be the result if a fire 
started in the subdivision, or a person was choking and the 
fire engine or ambulance and medical technicians had to 
wait an extra five minutes while the railroad people were 
notified that their stopped train or switching operations 
were blocking the subdivision access. Such a possibility 
-7-
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dictates as<:cond access frcl' of conflicts with the 
trains. 
The subdivision ordinance itself provides for the 
exercise of the kind of judgment exercised here. Section 
17-22-l, Revised Ordinances of Logan City, provides: 
"Purpose. The following rcquireJCwnts controlling 
the subdivision of land are designed to provide 
for the orderly development of LoGan City and to 
secure a coordinated road laynut and adequate 
provision for traffic, transportation~ recreation, 
water, drainage, sewage and other facilities in 
order to promote the health, safety, convenience 
and general welfare of the inhabitants of Logan 
City." 
In essence, one of the reasons for denial of Plaintiffs' 
subdivision was that it did not P.Jake "adequate provision 
for traffic" necessary for the promotion of the "health, 
safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants 
of Logan City," especially for the ones who would live 
in the suudivision. 
II 
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY DENIED APPROVAL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPOSED SUBDIVISION Brc.,;esE TEE PF10POSED SITE 
WAS NOT IN A LOCATION OR EK\'IR0\'1£'\T SUITABLE 
FOR RESIDENTIAL HOUSI~G. 
The subdivision ordinance provides: 
17-22-6. GenPral rPquirements and mini1:1um standards 
of design. 
(c) Lots. 
(J) The lot arrangcm<:nt and dFsign shall be sllch 
that lots will provide s;Jti:~f:-l.ctory and dc;;iralJl<! 
sites for buildings :1.nd b<· prop<-r1y J'(•lat<·d to 
topography, to the character o:' surroundin!; 
development, and to cxistin;~ and )lJ'olJahl•· f'uttJrc• 
requir<-!ments. H.70. 
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,;nJTUU!Hlql hy rai J road tracl's on thrr:e sides. R.97, 155. 
Only on<' m<•ans of ingress and ,·,;;rc:ss was provided 11·h ich 
would require that every man, woman and child would be 
required to cross the tracks to the east in order to exit or 
enter the development. R.97. The proposed development 
was in an hl-1 zone and along side a railroad spur. 
on the spur such as refri~erator cars l>·ould create a 
nir;httirr,e annoyance to the neighboring residents. 
Activity 
The possible conflicts with 1.1-1 use;; was brought 
to the attention of the developer (R.97, 97), and a request 
was made by ~.!unicipal Council Chairr.Jan Claude Burtenshaw, 
that protective covenants be written to at least protect 
the subdivision from within, but the record reveals that 
none were ever presented for approval prior to the time 
approval of the subdivision by the municipal council was 
demanded. The city planner reported that no protective 
covenants were ever filed with or presented to the City. R.l54. 
To approve a subdivision under the circumstances and 
in the locati<Jn requested by Plaintiffs would most likely 
create an undesirable residential area with dissatisfied 
residents moving out and unwitting new owners moving in 
until knowledge of the problems became common knowledge, 
causing property values to fall and permanent families to 
;;tay away, 
-9-
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III 
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
SUBDIVISim! BECAUSE IT DID ~OT PHOVIflE FOR 
WALKWAYS BET\';EEN BLOCKS OVEH 800 FEET LONG AS 
REQUIRED BY DEFENDA~T'S SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE. 
At the time Plaintiffs were urging approval of their 
subdivision most of the attention was centered on the 
controversy of whether the zoning ordinance authors intended 
to allow residential subdivisions in 1!-l zones :.lnd whether 
the ordinance itself allowed it. Other matters were of 
course considered, but one matter received little attention. 
Section 17-22-6, Logan City Ordinances, states: 
17-22-6. General requirements and minimum standards 
of design. 
(d) Blocks. 
l. The maxi~um length of blocks shall be not more 
than thirteen hundred (1300) feet. In blocks 
over eight hundred (800) feet long there shall be 
provided a dedicated walkway through the block 
at approximately the center of the block. Such 
walkway shall be not less than ten (10) feet wide. R.68. 
Plaintiffs never complied with this ordinance at any time. 
The subdi~ision plat itself illustrates this (R.l55) as does 
the affidavit of Mark Brenchley, City Planner. R.J51. 
IV 
THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISIO~ IS CONTRARY TO THE I~TENT 
AND SPIRIT OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE. 
In the above three arguments, Defendants have attempted 
to show the deficiencies in Plaintiffs' proposal as it 
relates to the City's subdi\'ision ordinance. In addition 
the sulJdivision :md its pro]Josed site is contrary to the 
-10-
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intent of the' :-coning ordin2nce itself. It is true that 
"single f:cmi 1y dwcl 1 ings" were pcrmi tted uses in t!1e ~f-1 
zone on th<: date! Pl:1intiffs submitted their application, 
but nowhere does the zoning ordinance refer to whole residential 
subdivisions. The planning commission, the municipal 
council and the planner were all under the impression that 
the zoning ordinance would be frustrated if such a 
development were allowed. R.95, 96, 97, 100, 154. The 
ordinance had always been construed by the planner as only 
allowing occasional residential use incidential to manufactur-
ing uses. R.l54. That is the way the ordinance now stands 
as amended (to clarify) in January 1978. R.lOl-102. 
v 
THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISION CONFLICTS WITH LOGAN CITY'S 
t,JASTEH PLAN. 
When approving subdivisions the municipality must look 
not only to the requirements of the subdivision ordinance 
but also to the zoning law and then finally to the city's 
master plan for guidance. In Wes Linn Land Co. v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 36 Ore.App. 39, 583, P.2d 1159 (1978) 
the county denied approval of the subdivision and the 
developer 3ppealcd to the Court of Appeals. The principal 
issue there was whether the county's findings were adequate. 
The court said they were not and remanded the case. During 
the course of r•'nclc:ring the cleci sian, the court referred 
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to the various considerations: 
"A subdivision application which conforms to a 
zoning ordinance may nevertheless be denied if the 
application of the zoning ordinance is inconsistent 
with the cor:1prehensive plan or with statewide 
goals, or if the application fails to conform to 
the subdivision ordin~nce, but the order must express 
the reasons the ~se permitted by the zoning 
ordinance is not allowed. Here, the application 
for residential development within a residential 
zone was denied in part, for exa~ple, because it 
was not agricultural, but there was no explicit 
application of any plan provision or goal which would 
override the zoning ordinance.'' 583 P.2d 1159, 1161. 
The same court in another case re,ferred to the 
considerations of subdivision ordinance, zoning law, and 
mater plan as having a hierarchical relationship: 
"There is a recognized hierarchical relationship 
between the comprehensive plan, zoning laws 
and subdivision ordinances. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy is the decision to approve or disapprove 
a tentative subdivision plan. In approving a 
subdivision, the decision-making body must first 
ascertain whether it is in co~pliance with the 
zoning ordinance. Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or. 
App. 761, 566 P.2d 904, rev. den. (1977). Next 
it must determine that the zoning ordinance is in 
compliance with the comprehensive plan. Baker v. 
City of hlilwaukie, supra. The plan has been likened 
to a constitution implemented by zoning and 
subdivision ordinances. Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 
supra, 271 Or. at 507, 533 P.2d 722." 1000 Friends 
OfOregon v. Board of County Commissioners, 32 Ore. 
App. 413, 575 P.2d 651, 656 (1978). 
The master plan contemplated no substantial residential 
development in the hl-1 zone. That was one of the reasons 
the planning commission rejected the proposed subdivision. 
R. 86, 96, 97. If Plaintiffs would have done their homework 
with regard to the expectations of the• !:1astPr plan, perhaps 
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II'<TC not to be clevel opec! in the '·.!-1 zone. 
Section l7-22-1(a) of Lo~an City Ordinances states: 
17-22-1. Preliminary plan. 
(a) Each subdivider of land should confer with the 
Planning Commission before preparing tfie preliminary 
plan in order to become thoroughly familiar with 
subdivision requireMents and with proposals of the 
official comprehensive plan affecting the area in which 
the proposed subdivision lies. (Emphasis added.) R.66. 
Thus, the ordinance imposes a duty upon the developer to 
know or to find out about the expectations of the master 
plan. 
VI 
THE DISAPPROVAL OF A SUBDIVISIO~ 0~ SEVERAL GROUXDS 
ONLY ONE OF WHICH MAY BE VALID IS SUFFICIENT 
JUSTIFICATION FOR DISAPPROVAL. 
The Plaintiffs' proposed subdivision was formally 
disapproved by the planninG conr.1ission on the follo1•:ing 
grounds: 
l. It was against the "intent of the Logan City 
Land Use (Zoning) Ordinance. R.87, 97, 157-158. 
2. It was contrary to the intent of the Logan 
City Master Plan. R.87, 97, 154, 157-158. 
3. It provided only one means of ingress and 
egress causing potential hazards. R.86, 87, 97. 
1. Railroad activity on three sides of the 
subdivision was a danger to those who would be 
living there. R.86, 87, 97. 
The Stipulated Statement of Facts states that the abo\·e 
reasons for rr'jcction arr" only :cu1~1e of the reasons. R.87, 
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paragraph lG. One other rt'ason, had they ~;iven th(, plan's 
details careful consideration, was the absence of th<o 
pedestrian walk\ray r~entioned in Arzumc:nt V above whi ell was 
brought to the trial court's attention in the motions which 
it ruled upon. 
The stated reasons the municipal council gave for 
rejecting the preliminary plan were: 
l. No protective covenants were provided to 
protect against ~-1 uses within the subdivision. 
R.l57, paragraph 2. 
2. There was only one means of ingress and egress 
and that was across a railroad track. R.l57, 
paragraph 2, 
3. To allow a residential subdivision in an M-1 
zone would be to violate the spirit and 
intent of the zoning ordinance. R.l57-158. 
4. The location of a residential subdivision in an 
M-1 zone runs contrary to the City's master 
plan. R.l57-l58. 
5. The subdivision would he surrounded by a railroad 
on three sides. R,86. 
An unstated reason for rejecting the preliminary 
subdivision plan which was not articulated by the municipal 
council until later was that it did not provide for pedestrian 
walkways through blocks of over BOO feet long. This matter 
was brought to the attention of trial court, but the 
court apparently considered the matter unimportant. 
If any of the above reasons are sufficient for proper 
denial of Plaintiffs' proposed subdivision, then this Court· 
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~;hould hold the Defendants' denial to be justified and 
reverse the trial court. Davian v. Planning Commission of 
City of Putnam, 174 Conn. 384, 387 /\.2cl 562 (1978). 
VI I 
THE J.!ERE APPLICATION FOR A SUBDIVISION OR THE APPROVAL 
OF THE SAv.IE BY A CITY, WITHOUT ~!ORE, DOES NOT 
CREATE VESTED RIGHTS IN THE SL'BDIVISION OWNER WHICH 
FOREVER FREE llHI FRO'.l SUBSEQ!JI::T ZONING CHANGES. 
Plaintiffs and the trial court avoided the application 
of the subsequently adopted zoning an:endments to Plaintiffs' 
planned subdivision by relying on Contracts Funding & Mortgage 
Exchange v.1laynes, ( Ut. 1974) 527 P. 2d 1073. In that 
case plaintiff purchased property which was then unzoned. 
Thereafter, he requested the county planning commission to 
grant him a conditional use permit for construction of mobile 
homes, which it did. Then about three weeks later after it 
had sought the opinions of neighbors in a hearing, it 
denied plaintiff's request for a building permit. About 
four months later, plaintiff renewed its request for a 
building permit. Two days after that the county amended 
its zoning ordinance to exclude the construction of mobile 
homes in that area, and at the same time denied plaintiff's 
request for a building permit. That case differs from this 
one in the following respects: 
1. In Contracts the zoning law clearly permitted 
the use requested, but in this case the 
zonin~ law said nothing about construction of 
subdivisions in IJ-1 zones and the city had 
~lways construed the ordinances to prohibit such 
development. R.l51. 
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2. In Contracts, pJaintitf had done <\<>rythin1; 
prcrequisitr~ to issu:~ncc of a llllilrling permit, 
then made a rr'qUr'~t for the same. In this 
case Plainti~ffs h:cd not done cvcrylhin1~ nccc"s:1rv 
and prerequisite to the io;s11::tr1ce of a building · 
permit. They had only applied for preliminary 
approval of a subdivision plan. 
3. In Contracts, the only reason for denial of 
plaintiff's building permit request was that 
local residents opposed the construction. No 
Other reason was given: 
"There is nothing in this record to indicate 
that the county or anyone else denied the 
application for a per~it because of failure 
to file something, pay something, clo something 
or violate something." 527 P.2d 1073, 1074. 
Reasons for refusing to approve Plaintiffs' plan 
for a subdivision are listed and explained above, but 
essentially they are: 
A. Subdivisions in U-1 zones violate the intent 
of the zoning ordinance. 
B. Subdivisions in ~-1 zones violate the intent of 
the master plan. 
C. The subcli.vision prcAid<=s inadertuate access (one 
access over railroad tracks). 
D. The subdivision provides for no walkways in blocks 
longer than 800 feet. 
E. The subdivision is in an improper location for 
residential living because it is bounded by 
railroad tracks on three sides. 
F. No protective covenants for excluding manufacturing 
uses within the subdivision have ever been 
presented, received or revie~ect. 
Again, this Court reiter~_tec; the principal problem in 
Contracts: 
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"--Uwrt' is no1hing in t!Jis record to show that 
pl<Jintiff ll'flS asked for rJ:tps, data, c:vidcncc, or 
anything clsc,--since it was nryer given any 
conditions with which it r1ust ha\'C and mav have 
complied,--only nothing but an arbitrary iurn-
down." 527 P.2d 1073, 1074. 
One can hardly say the Defendants gave Plaintiffs 
"nothing but an arbitrary turn-dmm." In a,ddi tion to the 
technical requirements for subdivisions and residential 
building, may the approving agency consider the broader 
policies and goals to be achieved by a municipality in an 
attempt to organi~e itself and to promote the health and 
welfare of its citizens? Certainly, the Plaintiffs have 
exhibited little interest in such matters. The City has 
done its best to anticipate and avoid the problems and serious 
dangers which most certainly will befall the proposed 
development and the people who may live in it. If this Court 
does not reverse, both it and the developer can assume 
responsibility for what happens there, because if the 
District Court's decision is upheld there is no regulation 
regarding zoning or subdivisions which the City can 
adopt at any time in the near or distant future, no matter 
how critical or important it might be, which the Plaintiffs 
in this case cannot ignore. As they argue, their rights 
arc "vested" and nothing can change that. 
The Utah case which comes closest to articulating 
till' r1ccepted principles found in the concepts of non-conforming 
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uses and vested rights is Wood v. ;:rnth Salt Lake, lS Ut.2d 
245, 390 P.2d 858 (1964). 
In Wood the plaintiff again was at the building permit 
stage when he ran into proble~s. His predecessors had 
subdivided and platted the property in 1955 which was 
accepted and dedicated by the City of North Salt Lake at 
approximately the same tirne. The zoning ordinance in 
question was enacted in 1957. In 1963 the plaintiffs 
were ready to construct homes and applied for a building permit. 
The city refused to grant it because the lots had only 
6,000 square feet (as originally platted) instead of 7,000 
as required by the 1957 ordinance. Prior to applying for 
the building per~it, water rnains and sewer mains had been 
installed in tl1e streets. Both systems provided connection 
facilities in front of each lot for which plaintiff's 
predecessors had paid their fair share. One of the lots 
was owned by a single owner who had no way of getting the 
extra square footage required by the city before he could 
build. Under these circumstances, the court said: 
"Without canvassing fine distinctions, we 
simply conclude that enforcement of the 
ordinance, subject of this action, eminently 
would he unfair, inequitable, discriminatory and 
inconsonant with realistic concepts of affinitive 
and privileged use of one's property. Enforcing 
this ordinance would render a 60' lot, owned by 
one individual, utterly useless and no doubt 
a weed-infested liability, although the purch~ser 
presumably \'.'as put to the expe-nse rnent i.oned abov<=--" 
390 P.2d 858, 859. 
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t' 
B('C:1Usc plaintiff would he unre~sonably damaged by 
impo~~ition of the nc:w regulation and because the city made 
no effort to as,;crt any police powers through appropriate 
procedures, the court relieved the owners of the 7,000 
square foot lot requirement. This court did, however, 
recognize: 
"In reasoning as we do, we are not unmindful of the 
authorities that sanction zoning ordinances 
where persons are not unreasonably damaged 
thereby, but at the same time we are alert to and 
mindful of the authorities that strike down such 
ordinances where resulting damage is substantial, 
as we think is true in the case of a one-unit 
owner in the platted area here--and we cannot 
lay down a rule for him, but not one for him in 
the area who happens to have two adjoining lots. 
We say this under the particular facts of this case, 
none other." 390 P.2d 858, 859. 
The above reference indicates that unless the damage 
to the private developer is substantial then efficacy should 
be given to the subsequently enacted or amended zoning 
ordinance. The only thing in the record which would 
indicate that Plaintiffs are damaged at all is the fact 
that they have spent $1,335 for a boundary survey and 
$890 for the preparation of a preliminary subdivision plat. 
It is submitted that the boundary survey has value to the 
Plaintiffs regardless of what they do with their property. 
Thus, Defendant is left with the loss of the $890 for the 
preliminary subdivision plat. That amount is insubstantial 
for purposes of acquiring vested rights under the circum-
-;lances of this case. 
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Plaintiffs also cited !\.(cady to Pour Ine. v. 1.\c:Cuy, 
95 Idaho 510, 511 P.2d 792 (1973) a'; bcin1' in support of 
their position. Again, R'oady To Pour invulvcd a city's 
refusal to grant a building permit after plaintiff had 
done everything necessary or prerequisite to its issuance. 
Plaintiff attacked the subsequently enacted zoning ordinance 
which completely eliminated the industrial zone as arbitrary, 
capricious, and confiscatory. ~o such attack on Logan 
City's amendment has been made. In Ready To Pour the court 
pointed to "uncontroverted evidence" that there were 
similar cement batch plants in the area and other operations, 
including the city's which were industrial in nature. 
There is nothing in the case which stands for the proposition 
that once the plaintiff built his batch plant, that it 
didn't become a non-conforming use and subject to the 
ordinance and that all other requests for building permits 
could not be denied because of the change in the zone. 
Here the Plaintiffs were not at the building stage. No 
building permits have ever been requested or denied. ~ost 
likely it will take several years to ~onstruct homes on 
all 87 lots planned for the subdivision, yet Plaintiffs claim 
perpetual freedom of their pla:1ned development from subsequently 
enacted zoning ordinances, no matter how great the need. 
That is not reasonable. 
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AL Llw tri;d l"vel Plaintiffs also cited Countv of 
~.!;Jricop<J. v. An:---.1•:ool Inc., (Ari?:. 197:1) :'i06 P.2d 282, and 
Hnb1nson v. Li nLc, (Ariz. 19GG) 420 P.2cl 923. In the 
County of Maricopa case the developer had secured the 
approval of both the planner and the planning commission. 
After the county refused to approve the subdivision plan, 
plaintiff sued in mandamus. There it ~as clear, and the court 
so found, that plaintiff had met all the legal requirements 
for approval, and once approved and filed, the lots became 
"legally established" by statutory r:Jandate and no longer 
subject to zoning changes affecting their size, etc. The 
earlier case of Robinson v. Lintz, supra, was cited. That 
also was a mandamus case against the City of Phoenix for 
refusing to issue building permits because the previously 
filed subdivision lots did not meet the minimum area 
requirements of the city ordinance. The subdivision had 
previously been a part of the unincorporated area of the 
county. The subdivider applied for building permits based 
upon her previously filed subdivision. The question in that 
case was whether plaintiff's lots had become "legally 
established" pursuant to a county ordinance which allowed 
building on substandard lots 11hich had been "legally 
established" prior to the adoption of the ordinance making 
them substandard. That situation is quite a different case 
than is now before the Court. 
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Plaintiffs failed to cite the 1nost recent 1\rizona case 
which relates to the other t1•:o cases and the problem at 
hand. Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 119 1\ri~. 486, 581 P.2d, 
1136 (1978) is a typical example of the proper application 
of the universally accepted principles of vested rights and 
non-conforming uses. In that case plaintiffs filed their 
subdivision with maximum 10,000 sq. ft. lots while the land 
was still in the unincorporated ar0a of the county (1960). 
In 1963 Scottsdale annexed the area. Their zoning ordinance 
required 35,000 sq. ft. lots. At the time of the annexation, 
plaintiffs had not yet begun to build upon the lots. Plaintiffs 
brought an action seeking to compel the City of Scottsdale 
to issue building permits and to have their subdivision 
plat and lots declared "legally existing." The trial court 
found in favor of the city, the intermediate appellate 
court reversed the city, and Arizona's Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of the intermediate appeals court 
and affirmed the decision of the ~rial court. The court 
stated the issue as follows: 
"The principal question at issue is whether the 
appellant's have since 1963 a vested right to 
develop substandard lots within the City of 
Scottsdale because of the recording of their plat. 
We think not." 581 P.2d 1136, 1137. 
The court referring to the general principle stated: 
"It has been repeatedly lwld that subdivision 
ordinances apply to lots on prior recorded maps 
which were unsold at the time of the ordinance's 
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fs 
<cnaclm.,nt. Ziman v. Villahe of Glencoe, 1 Ill.!\pp.3rd 
912, 275 ~.E.2d 16R (1971); Sherman-Colonial 
Rc:t_lly_Cnrp. v. Goldsmith, lGG Conn. 175, 230 
A.2cl S()g (l9G7); B1evPns v. City of ~.lanchester, 
1::30 N.H. 28<1, 170 A.2d 121 (l9Gl); State ex rel. 
Mar-Well Inc. v. Dodge, 113 Ohio App. 118, 177 
N.E.2d 515 (l9GO); Caruthers v. Board of Adjustment, 
290 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App.l956)." Id. at 1137. 
The court then went on to distinguish the case of Robinson 
v. Lintz, supra and stated that Robinson '' ... does not hold 
that such a lot is unaffected by subsequent zoning enactments.'' 
Id. at 1138. The court further stated that: 
"Robinson did not concern itself with the problem 
we must decide here; namely whether the filing 
of a plat immunizes a parcel of real estate from 
subsequent zoning regardless of how urgent the need 
for regulations might be." Id. at 1138. 
The court then compared the continued development of lots 
in a subdivision with the vested rights principles applied 
in building permit cases (where the zoning ordinance is 
changed after the issuance of a building permit). The opinion 
concluded: 
"We have held that where the amount of work which 
was done toward the construction of a service station 
was of small consequence, the permittee acquired 
no vested right to complete the construction of 
the building if the board of supervisors exercised 
its power to rezone the property and revoked the 
building permit. Verner v. Redman, 77 Ariz. 310, 
271 P.2d 4G8 (195<1)." !d. at 1138. 
The question here as was in the Dawe case, is whether what 
Plaintiffs have done toward construction (actually putting 
the land to us~was of such small consequence that the 
subdivider is considered to have acquired no vested rights. 
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That was essentially the question posed in Wood v. !~orth 
Salt Lake, supra where this court in equity held that 
plaintiffs woulcl lose too much when the cost of the 
otherwise useless lot and the utility stubs to each lot 
were considered. The only thing these Plaintiffs will lose 
if they are not allowed to go ahead is the $890 paid for 
drafting the preliminary subdivision plan. The boundary 
survey has value to Plaintiffs regardless of what they 
develop on the property. 
There are nuoerous cases which deal with the same 
vested rights issue in other states and the question always 
is the same: How much damage will the party suffer if the 
zoning ordinance w~re applied to the balance of his 
subdivision development or to his planned subdivision, or 
to his planned building, or to his partially constructed 
building. One such case is State v. Dodge, (Ohio 1960), 177 
N.E.2d 515. There the plaintiff applied for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the issuance of a building permit based 
on the fact that the subdivision on which the building 
was to be erected had been approved and filed before the 
city changed its zoning ordinance requiring homes in that 
area to have frontage of 100 feet instead of 50 feet as was 
the case under the old law. There the court stated: 
'~he mere fact that an allotment plat is approved 
and recorded does not irre\·ocably fix the rights 
of the parties. Valid chanf,CS m:1y thencafter be 
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be made in tl!e ~oning regulations, and the 
a1lotlcr must conform thcrl!to ... " 
"There arc no buildings on the lands of this 
allotment that do not ~onform to the requirements 
of the zoning law. The claim of nonconforming use is 
based on the assertion that, as soon as an 
allotment is platted, and such plat approved by 
the authorities, and funds are expended to improve 
the grade and to lay out streets, a use of the lands 
has occurred which causes it to be not subject to 
any zoning regulations adopted after the approval 
of the allotment plan." 
"The fallacy of this clair:1 is so readily apparent 
that no lengthy discussion need be made. This proposal 
would prevent any changes in city planning, and fix 
a use that never could be amended. In addition, the 
claim of "use" would be based upon hope rather than 
upon occupancy and beneficial employment of the 
lands. The land in this allotment without houses 
did not become, by reason of the plat approval, a 
nonconforming use." (Emphasis added.) 177 N.E.2d 
515, 519-520. 
In Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299 (1961), 170 A.2d 
267, annotated in 95 ALR 2d 751, the property owner filed 
a proposed subdivision before the town had even adopted a 
subdivision ordinance. The minimum lot area at that time had 
apparently not been determined. However, the town proposed 
to change the zoning requirement to require 10,000 sq. ft. 
lots in that area. The question was whether the property 
owner could build a cottage on a 4,000 sq. ft. lot using the 
rationale of the continuation of a nonconforming use. The 
court rejected the idea saying that the lot had not yet been 
put to a use and that a proposed use cannot create a non-
conforming use. The use must be actual, and the mere filing 
of a plat or map could not foreclose a zoning authority from 
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taking action which it, in its good judr;mcnt deemed 
necessary. It should be notrd that the prop<:rty m1nc-r ilau 
already built upon 179 of 448 undersized building lots and 
had spent in excess of 328,000 to erect a permanent office 
building and install other improvements for his development. 
Another very good example is Blundell v. City of West 
Helena, (Ark. 1975) 522 S.K.2d 661 where the court disapproved 
the use of some mobile home lots but approved the use of 
others because construction of various kinds of utility 
lines, grading of the lots, etc. indicated there was 
"substantial use" even though the mobile homes had not 
actually been moved in. The court cited a number of cases 
holding that contemplated use without active steps taken 
beyond preliminary work or planning was necessary before a 
party could claim vested rights to continue the use. 
"Preliminary contracts or work which is not of a 
substantial nature is not sufficient to establish 
a vested right. County of Saunders v. Moore, supra. 
The mere purchase cf property with intention to 
devote it to a use is not sufficient in spite of 
preliminary work, such as clearing, grading and 
excavating, if that owner has not incurred 
substantial obligations relating directly to the 
use of the property." 522 S.\';,2d 611, 6G8. 
See also Town of Lebanon v. Woods, (Conn. 1965) 215 A.2d 
112, R. A. Vachon & Son Inc. v. City of Concord (N.H. 1972), 
289 A.2d 646, Youngblood v. Board of Superviso_rs of San 
Diego City (Cal. 1977) 71 Cal.App.3rd G55, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
741. 
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Disregarding the fact that Plaintiffs'proposed 
subdivision is not yet approvPd and filed, most all the 
treatises on the subject reflect the same point of view as 
the above cases. In 82 Am. Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning, 
373, 698-700, 186, Nature and Extend of Use or Vested Right, 
the rule is stated as follows: 
''Most courts impose the requirement of actual use, as 
distinguished from mere planned or intended use. A 
mere contemplated use is insufficient to establish 
an existing nonconforming use within the meaning of 
a zoning law exempting nonconforming uses. A right 
to a nonconforming use is not consummated merely by 
reason of the intent of a landowner to conduct that 
particular use on his land; before a supposed 
nonconforming use may be protected, it must exist 
somewhere outside the property owner's mind. It 
has been held that a nonconforming use is not 
established merely by showing that one has purchased 
property for the purpose of a particular use. Platted 
but undeveloped land is not normally regarded as a 
"use" in zoning law for purposes of establishing 
a prior nonconforming use, and, in the absence 
of a statute or ordinance providing otherwise, the 
filing of a map or plat by a developer of a subdivision 
plat is not an existing use of land which can form the 
basis of a nonconforming use. According to some courts, 
an "existing" use means the utilization of premises 
so that they may be known in the neighborhood as being 
employed for the purpose of that use." 
"So far as establishing a nonconforming use is concerned, 
mere preparation for use is not tantamount to actual 
use, and even the investment of money in preparation 
for a particular use of land does not stake out a 
vested right to that use._ Ordinarily where no work has 
been commenced, the fact that plans had been made 
for the erection of a building before the adoption 
of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the kind of building 
contemplated is held not to exempt the property from 
the operation of the zoning regulation. In order for 
a landowner to proceed with the construction of a 
building or facility which may be utilized for a 
nonconforming use, the cornmencel'lent of the construction 
must have been substantial, or substantial costs 
toward completion of the job must have been incurred." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In Anderson's work, ,\mc:rican L~111· of /.oning, til<~ rulL' or 
principle is st:-~tccd as follows: 
"No nonconforming usP is 'st ~~bl i shed l':hc-rc" the dcvcl upLr 
has received preliminarv approval of his plat, or even 
where filing is followe~ by extensive preliminary 
work. The courts have said that to recogni~e a 
nonconforming use at this early stage wuuld result 
in less risk to the subdi,ider, but it would tend 
to perpetuate the prohJems that zoning is intended 
to eliminate." l American Law of Zoning, 402, Sec. 
6.21, Filing and Approval of PJat. 
In hlcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, the rule is 
stated as follows: 
"The general rule is that actual use is distinguished 
from merely contemplated use when a zoning regulation 
opposed to it becomeseffective is essential to its 
protection as a lawful nonconforming use. Accordingly, 
the question of an existing business or other use 
at the time zoning restrictions become effective 
must be considered in the light of the principle that 
the law is concerned, not with a mere plan or 
intention, but with overt acts or failure to act. 
Thus, it is not the present intention to put property 
to a future use but the present use of the property 
which must be the criterion. That is to say, mere 
intentions or plans at the time a zoning ordinance 
becomes effective to use particular land or dwellings 
for a certain use doPs not entitle one to that usc in 
contravention of the ordinance .... Indeed, the fact 
that a party makes a large investment in a city lot, 
which at the time it is purchased is free of 
restrictions, with an intent to use it for business 
purposes, does not invalidate a zoning ordinance 
subsequently adopted insofar as that ordinance restricts 
the use of the lot to residen~ial purposes. So also, 
the mere filing of maps for the subdivision of a 
parcel of real estate is not an establ1shmentof 
a vested right to continue a use nonconforming to 
subsequently enacted subdivision regulations." 
(Emphasis added.) SA '.!cQuilJin, \!unicipal Curpora"Lions, 
34, Zoning, Sec. 25.188, l!SE";s Int,:ndcd or Planned. 
The burden of proving the existence of vested rights 
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to make it clear thatonly some of the planning commission's 
reasons for rejecting the subdivision plan were listed in 
its letter to the municipal council. R.87. The focus 
indeed was on the single issue, but that does not mean that 
all other issues and requirements were met as was the 
conclusion of the trial judge. 
CO\'CLUSIDN 
It is clear from the affidavits, exhibits, and the 
Stipulated Statement of Facts that Plaintiffs' proposed 
subdivision has never been in a condition to be approVbd. 
The clarification or amendment of the zoning ordinance 
to clear up what would otherwise develop as a very serious 
problem in the uses of M-1 land does prohibit the Plaintiffs 
from carrying out their plans. No "use" of the land 
had begun, and Plaintiffs did not expend so much money in 
preparation for use as to acquire a vested right to 
develop contrary to the subsequently amended zoning 
ordinance br any other zoning ordinance which might be 
enacted sometime in the future. 
RESPECTFULLY SUWI!ITTED this~ day of May, 1979. 
oll"nger 
for Defendant-Appellant 
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West Helena, supra. Here the trial court as~iuncd that 
plaintiff had done everything necessary prior to appro~al 
of his subdivision plan: 
'' •.. after the plaintiff had done everything 
procedurally he was supposed to do he was put 
off by the city who then passed the ordinance ... " 
R.l70. 
Although the trial court in this case referred to the items 
listed in paragraph 9 of the Stipulated Statement of Facts 
(R.86) as not being resolved (conflicts with the master plan, 
not adequate access, no protective covenants, and the danger 
of the railroad tracks on three sides), he went on to 
conclude that the subdivision was ready in all respects 
for approval, ignoring the items listed in paragraph 9 
of the Stipulated Statement of Facts as well as the facts 
established by affidavits of ~ark Brenchley (R.l53-l54) and 
Council Chairman Claude Burtenshaw. R.l57-l58. The 
requested roadways and pedestrian path\•:ays were not layed 
out, nor were protective covenants provided as required 
by city ordinance. These considerations clearly indicate 
that even if it were conceded that the land use ordinance 
permitted residential subdivisions in \,!-1 zones, not merely 
isolated occasional houses incidental to ~-1 uses, the 
subdivision could not have been legally approved at the ti~e 
it was presented. For that reason, the Contracts Funding 
case is not good precedent for this case. Defendants tried 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed to c~pies of the 
foregoing Brjef of Appellant, postage prepaid, to John 
Preston Creer, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, Senior & 
Senior, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this~ day of May, 1979. 
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